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Quon v. Arch Wireless: The Ninth Circuit
Correctly Assesses Fourth Amendment




Wireless providers process over seventy-five billion text-messages
every month in the United States.' Text-messaging is often used for personal
communication, but its ability to transmit information with instantaneous
speed has also created an ideal medium in business settings.2 Due to the
sheer volume of these daily transmissions, text-messaging creates problems
of regulation, security, and privacy for both employers and employees.3
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit de-
cided Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co. on first impression and ad-
dressed issues of the Stored Communications Act (hereinafter SCA) and the
Fourth Amendment right to be protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures regarding the content of employees' text-messages on devices issued
by an employer.4 The court's ruling protected the employee's right to a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy with respect to the content of his transmitted
text-messages. 5 Nevertheless, the opinion is narrowly tailored to the facts of
the case, and the court's rationale provides precedent that calls for a careful
examination to prevent future abuse in this area.
Marvin A. Liang is a May 20 10 candidate for Juris Doctor at Southern Method-
ist University Dedman School of Law. He graduated from the University of
Texas at Austin with a Bachelor of Arts in the Plan II Honors Program and a
minor in Biology.
1. CTIA - The Wireless Association, Wireless Quick Facts, http://www.ctia.org/
content/index.cfm/AID/10323 (data current as of June 2008) (last visited Sept.
25, 2009).
2. Text-messaging is also known as SMS, or Short Message Service. Util. Con-
sumers' Action Network v. Sprint Solutions, Inc., No. C07-2231RJB, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53075, at *12 n.7 (S.D. Cal. July 10, 2008). Text-messaging
"enables short messages of generally no more than 140-160 characters in
length to be sent and transmitted from a cell phone. Unlike [standard, one-way]
paging, but similar to e-mail, short messages are stored and forwarded at SMS
centers, which means a person can retrieve messages later if the person is not
immediately available to receive them." Id. at * 12-13 n.7.
3. See William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law
You Must Be Honest, 12 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 49, 50 (2008).
4. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
5. Id. at 909.
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B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2001, Arch Wireless contracted with the City of Onta-
rio, California (hereinafter City) to provide wireless text-messaging services.
Arch Wireless provided alphanumeric pagers to the City, which distributed
the devices to their employees, including Sergeants Jeff Quon and Steve
Trujillo.
Although the City did not have an official policy for text-messaging, it
did have a general "Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy" (hereinaf-
ter Policy), providing that employees were to use City-owned electronic sys-
tems and associated equipment for official business purposes only.6
Additionally, the Policy stated that "[a]ccess to the Internet and the e-mail
system is NOT confidential; and information produced either in hard copy or
electronic form is considered City property."7
In 2000, prior to receiving their pagers, Quon and Trujillo signed an
"Employee Acknowledgment," which contained language similar to that of
the general technology-use Policy of the Ontario Police Department (herein-
after "Department").8 In 2002, Quon attended a Department meeting where a
senior officer informed the employees that messages on the new pagers
would be considered e-mail and would therefore fall under the City's policies
for monitoring and auditing.
Although the City did not have an official policy governing the use of
the pagers, the contract with Arch Wireless allowed 25,000 characters of use
per month for each device before a penalty overage fee would apply. Fur-
thermore, the City's informal policy was that Lieutenant Steve Duke would
merely collect overage fees from an employee in violation of excessive pager
use rather than conduct an audit of the messages. This happened "three or
four times" with Officer Quon, and in each of those instances, Quon paid the
City for the extra charges.9
In August 2002, Duke became 'tired of being a bill collector' so Chief
Lloyd Scharf ordered a review of the text-message transcripts 'to determine
if the messages were exclusively work related, which would require an in-
crease in the number of characters officers were permitted, as had occurred in
the past, or if they were using the pagers for personal matters.' 0
Since the City officials were unable to directly access the messages,
they contacted Arch Wireless, who delivered transcripts of the messages to
the Department for auditing. Pursuant to its investigation, the Department
discovered that many messages on Quon's pager were "personal in nature
6. Id.
7. Id. at 896 (emphasis in original).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 897.
10. Id.
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and often sexually explicit."" The court also noted that the text-messages
"were directed to and received from, among others, the other Appellants."2
C. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
The City employees initially filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California in 2004, naming Arch Wireless, the
City, city officials, and the Department as the defendants.13 The employees
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. section 2702 of the Stored Communications
Act (SCA) and California Penal Code section 629.86, as well as an invasion
of privacy violating Article I, Section 1 of the California constitution.
D. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
The trial court held that Arch Wireless did not violate the SCA because
the company acted as a "remote computing service" (hereinafter RCS) rather
than an "electronic communication service" (hereinafter ECS) under SCA
section 2702(a).14 Therefore, the company committed no injury when it re-
leased the transcripts of the text-messages to the City. The trial court also
held that the government defendants did not violate the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. The court reasoned that a plaintiff must show a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his text-messages and show that the government's search
and seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances to prevail on a Fourth
Amendment claim.15 The district court looked to Lieutenant Duke's informal
policy of not auditing pagers if the employee would pay the overage fees and
held, as a matter of law, that the employees had a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding their text-messages. 6 Looking at the issue of reasonable-
ness, the district court held a jury trial to examine if Chief Scharaf's intent
was to uncover misconduct or to determine the suitability of the 25,000 char-
acter limit for each pager.' 7 Since the jury found that Chief Scharaf's intent
11. Id. at 898.
12. Id.
13. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal.
2006).
14. Id. at 1129.
15. Id. at 1139; see O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (stating that
"public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests
of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well
as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the stan-
dard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.").
16. Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
17. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2008).
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was to determine the efficacy of the character limit, the court absolved all of
the government defendants of liability for the text-message search.18
In December 2006, plaintiffs filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) motion to amend or alter the judgment and a 59(a) motion for new
trial.'9 The district court denied each of these motions, and the plaintiffs
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.20
E. COURT OF APPEAL HOLDING AND OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE
The Ninth Circuit first examined the SCA claim and disagreed with the
district court that Arch Wireless acted as an RCS for the City.21 Therefore,
since Arch Wireless was providing an "electronic communication service"
for the City, the company violated the SCA when it knowingly released the
text-message transcripts to the City. 22 Since the court of appeals agreed with
the Appellants, it held that the district court erred to grant summary judgment
in favor of Arch Wireless.23 The court of appeals then turned to the Fourth
Amendment claim and held that the text-message search violated the plain-
tiffs' Fourth Amendment rights as well as their privacy rights under the Cali-
fornia constitution.24 The search was found to be unreasonable because the
Department could have used alternative and less intrusive ways to conduct its
investigation.25 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the law entitled Chief
Scharf to qualified immunity, but the California constitution did not afford
statutory-immunity protection to either the City or the Department.26
F. COURT'S RATIONALE
The court began its analysis by examining section 2702 of the SCA,
which governs liability for both ECS and RCS providers.27 According to the
SCA's plain language, an ECS is defined as "any service which provides to
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communica-
18. Id.
19. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 2006 WL 4791384 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
2006).
20. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2008).
21. Id. at 900.
22. Id. at 903.
23. Id. at 900.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 909.
26. Id. at 910.
27. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008).
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tions."28 The court stated that, on its face, this definition seemed to describe
the text-messaging services Arch Wireless provided to the City.29
On the other hand, an RCS is defined in the SCA as "the provision to
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an elec-
tronic communications system."30 The court noted that Arch Wireless did
not provide "computer storage" to the city, nor did it provide any "processing
services."3
To bolster these interpretations, the court turned to the legislative his-
tory of the SCA.32 A 1986 Senate report clarifies "data communication" to
include services involving cellular phones and paging devices. 33 In the same
report, "storage" is analogized to when "physicians and hospitals maintain
medical files in offsite data banks."34 "Processing information" is compara-
ble to when "businesses of all sizes transmit their records to remote com-
puters to obtain sophisticated data processing services."35 The Ninth Circuit
noted that neither of these examples, which illustrate functions of an RCS, is
accurate in describing the services that Arch Wireless provided as a
company.36
To dispose of any remaining notion that Arch Wireless is not an ECS,
the court cited its own decision in Theofel v. Farey Jones.37 In that case,
NetGate was an e-mail service provider, undisputedly an ECS, which re-
tained e-mails on its servers for "backup protection."38 The court notes that
Arch Wireless and NetGate supplied closely analogous services.39 Both
companies provided a means to transmit electronic communication from one
user to another, and both companies maintained a copy of delivered
messages on their server.40 The court held that the similarities between the
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
29. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006).
31. Quon, 529 F.3d at 901.
32. Id.
33. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556
(listing data communication providers to include "large-scale electronic mail
operations, computer-to-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless
telephones, paging devices").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 10-1l.
36. Quon, 529 F.3d at 902.
37. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004).
38. See id. at 1075.
39. Quon, 529 F.3d at 902.
40. Id.
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companies in business function and operation support categorizing Arch
Wireless as an ECS.41
As a result of analyzing the plain language of the SCA, legislative his-
tory of the SCA, and federal case law, the Ninth Circuit held that Arch Wire-
less was an ECS.42 Although both an ECS and RCS can release private
information to "an addressee or intended recipient of such communication,
only an RCS can release such information with the lawful consent of the
subscriber."43 It is undisputed that the City was only a subscriber and not an
addressee or intended recipient, so Arch Wireless violated the SCA when it
knowingly turned over the transcripts of text-messages to the City.44 Conse-
quently, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor
of Arch Wireless and determined that judgment in favor of Appellants was
appropriate as a matter of law.45
The court then turned to Appellant's Fourth Amendment claim to ex-
amine if "users of text-messaging services such as those provided by Arch
Wireless have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text-messages
stored on the service provider's network."46 The court answered this ques-
tion in the affirmative47 after examining the "totality of the circumstances to
determine whether a search is reasonable."48
Since Quon signed the Department's general computer usage policy, he
should not have an expectation of privacy regarding his pager transmis-
sions. 49 However, the "operational reality" at the Department created a dif-
ferent situation.50 Lieutenant Duke had make it clear that he would not audit
pagers as long as an employee would pay the overage charges, and Quon had
exceeded his usage "three or four times" without an audit after paying the
extra fees.51 The court looked to the fact that Duke was "in charge of the
41. Id. at 903.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 900; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(l)-(3) (West 2006).




48. United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that "the
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.").
49. See Quon, 529 F.3d at 906; see Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743
(7th Cir. 2002) (stating that a company destroyed any reasonable expectation of
privacy for its employee when the company announced that it "could inspect
the laptops that it furnished for the use of its employees.").
50. Quon, 529 F.3d at 907.
51. Id.
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pagers, and it was reasonable for Quon to rely on the policy-formal or in-
formal-that Lieutenant Duke established and enforced."52
The court then examined whether the text-message search itself was rea-
sonable and held that it was not. 53 Regarding the scope of a search, the court
stated, "[i]f less intrusive methods were feasible, or if the depth of the inquiry
or extent of the seizure exceed[s] that necessary for the government's legiti-
mate purposes," a search is unreasonable and violates Fourth Amendment
privacy rights.54 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's state-
ment that less-intrusive alternatives to verify why Quon exceeded his allotted
monthly pager usage did not exist.-5
The court turned to the issue of whether Chief Scharf should be granted
qualified immunity, even if the court concluded that he violated Appellant's
Fourth Amendment privacy rights.56 Using a two-step inquiry,57 the Ninth
Circuit held that the Chief was entitled to qualified immunity because "at the
time of the search, there was no clearly established law regarding whether
users of text-messages that are archived, however temporarily, by the service
provider have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages."58
52. Id.
53. Id. at 908.
54. Id.; Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir.
1987).
55. Quon, 529 F.3d at 909 (stating that "the Department could have warned Quon
that for the month of September he was forbidden from using his pager for
personal communications, and that the contents of all of his messages would be
reviewed to ensure the pager was used only for work-related purposes during
that time frame. Alternatively, if the Department wanted to review past usage,
it could have asked Quon to count the characters himself, or asked him to
redact personal messages and grant permission to the Department to review the
redacted transcript.").
56. Id.
57. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (explaining that the first part of the
test is to view the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury
to see if the officer's conduct violates a constitutional right, and if so, then the
second part of the test asks for a determination of whether the right was clearly
established.); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009) (reconsidering
the Saucier procedure, and holding that, "while the sequence set forth therein is
often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory in all cases"
but stating that, "Saucier was correct in noting that the two-step procedure pro-
motes the development of constitutional precedent and is especially valuable
for questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immu-
nity defense is unavailable").
58. Quon, 529 F.3d at 910.
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Finally, the court dismissed the City and the Department's claim of stat-
utory immunity from liability. 59 Lieutenant Duke's informal policy allowed
officers to use the Department pagers for personal use and exceed the
monthly character allotment as long as excess charges were paid.60 Keeping
this in mind, the court stated that Quon could not have committed any mis-
conduct, which would be a prerequisite to initiate a formal proceeding.61 The
Ninth Circuit then held that the City and Department could not be entitled to
statutory immunity in the absence of a proceeding.62
G. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S APPROACH
In recent years, a rapid increase to use new technology in the workplace
has created concerns of diminished personal privacy rights.63 Generally, case
law has centered on claims and issues related to e-mail, but this Ninth Circuit
holding in Quon v. Arch Wireless has brought text-messaging to the forefront
of discussion. As a case of first-impression, the Ninth Circuit's holding can
be instructive as to where the law is headed. However, the opinion is also
tailored to the specific facts and issues of the case, so a thorough analysis of
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is important for the future scenarios that may
be closely analogous to this decision.
1. Stored Communications Act
The Ninth Circuit correctly decided the first issue that Arch Wireless
violated the SCA. The text-messaging company provided a service that al-
lowed users the ability to send or receive electronic communications, which
fits the plain-meaning definition of an ECS.64 Furthermore, the legislative
history clearly demonstrates that Congress intended to address specific pri-
vacy issues in electronic communication with little ambiguity when it drafted
the SCA.65 Although the Senate Report was issued in 1986, the basic princi-




62. Id.; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 821.6 (2006) (stating that "[a] public employee is not
liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts mali-
ciously and without probable cause.").
63. See generally Herbert, supra note 3 at 49.
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006) (stating that an ECS is "any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications.").
65. See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209-1212
(2004).
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and examples allow Arch Wireless to properly be characterized as an ECS.66
The Senate Report was also helpful to dismiss Arch Wireless' claim that its
company was an RCS.67
H. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
The Ninth Circuit was also correct in holding that "users of text-messag-
ing services such as those provided by Arch Wireless have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their text-messages stored on the service provider's
network."68 Although Quon had signed the Department's electronic-use Pol-
icy, the court properly applied the reasonableness standard to the Fourth
Amendment analysis, holding that the operational reality at the Department
cleared Quon of liability.69
The Ninth Circuit also correctly held that the text-message search itself
was unreasonable. A search is unreasonable if less intrusive means are feasi-
ble, and the court listed several alternatives that could have been employed to
verify the efficacy of the character limit.70 Although some of the suggestions
may have been feasible, such as asking "Quon to count the characters him-
self," they would have been burdensome and inefficient since the usage had
clearly gone over 25,000 characters.7 1 A more practical solution advocated
by the court was to warn Quon that he was forbidden from using his pager
for personal communication and to review his messages from that point for-
ward to ensure the device was used for work-related purposes only.72
Using the specific facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit properly held that
Chief Scharf was entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly
established law in this area.73 The court granted the protection reluctantly as
it explicitly reasoned that its decision was based on the lack of precedential
law on this issue. 74 Therefore, future individuals facing a similar situation as
Scharf may not obtain a similar outcome. Furthermore, the court correctly
applied section 821.6 of the California Government Code- since Quon's
actions did not constitute misconduct and did not fall within the scope of the
66. See S. REP. No. 99-541, supra note 33 at 3.
67. See id. (listing examples of RCS functions to include file storage and data
processing, none of which describe the service that Arch Wireless provided to
the City).
68. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904.
69. Id. at 907-08; United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007).
70. Quon, 529 F.3d at 908.
71. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 (C.D.
Cal. 2006) (stating that the "transcripts for Quon's pages tallied forty-six pages
in length").
72. See Quon, 529 F.3d at 909.
73. Id. at 910.
74. Id.
2009]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
Code, the City and Department were not protected by statutory immunity.75
These two holdings are narrowly tailored to the details of the present case,
and therefore, they may not be directly applicable to another situation with
dissimilar facts.
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
Immediately after the Ninth Circuit published this opinion, media cover-
age on the case seemed to imply a revolution in workplace wireless commu-
nications as a number of articles viewed the ruling as a tremendous victory
for online privacy.76 Information Week, a business technology publication,
stated that, "Employees' text messages are private, even when transmitted on
devices their companies pay for."77 Although statements like these are tech-
nically true to a certain extent, they are misleading because Quon is limited
to a specific set of facts and does not apply in every situation involving text-
messages.
First, the court's holding that Quon had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy will only protect employees that work for public employers because the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to private actors.78 It is incorrect to state
that employees that work for private companies enjoy the same protection.
Second, public employers still have the right to monitor text-message trans-
missions on government-owned devices. If an employer has a monitoring
policy in place but does not enforce it, the "operational reality" of the policy
may defeat the later ability to monitor unannounced. Therefore, individuals
in charge of workplace monitoring should never make representations to em-
ployees that an electronic resources policy will not be followed or will be
loosely followed. The present case makes it clear that employees should be
continually and repeatedly reminded of precise monitoring policies and pri-
vacy disclaimers so they are on notice that their text-messages can and will
be checked for improper usage.
75. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 821.6 (2006); See Quon, 529 F.3d at 910.
76. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jun. 19, 2008, available at http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/j un/ 19/local/me-text 19.
77. K.C. Jones, Court Rules Employee Text Messages Are Private, INFORMATION
WEEK, Jun. 19, 2008, available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/se-
curity/privacy/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=208700666.
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984) (stating that, "This Court has also consistently construed this protection
as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as
an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official.").
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J. OVERVIEW OF THE CRITIQUE
Aside from protecting privacy rights, this holding may be a double-
edged sword. With the rising trend of company-issued electronic devices, it
is likely that more and more messages unrelated to official business matters
are sent every day. Public entities taking note of this decision should
strengthen their auditing policies, such as implementing regular monitoring,
to avoid the problems that Arch Wireless and the Ontario Police Department
were faced with. On the other hand, a savvy employee who realizes their
employer has an "informal monitoring policy" similar to the one in Quon
may carefully be able to avoid their communication transcripts being ana-
lyzed. This decision does not afford broad privacy protections for text-mes-
saging because the holding is tailored to the facts of the case. However, as a
case of first-impression, "[t]he extent to which the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides protection for the contents of electronic communications in the Internet
age is an open question."79 Indisputably, the holding in Quon is at the fore-
front of Internet and electronic jurisprudence, and it is likely to help shape
other decisions in this area of law.
79. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904.
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